Channel Coordination When Retailers Compete
Channel Coordination When Retailers Compete
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DOI：
10.1287/mksc.14.4.360
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发表时间：
1995-11
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
C. Ingene;M. Parry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Ingene;M. Parry
本文探讨了制造商的渠道协调，通过竞争的零售商进行销售，并平等对待这些零售商，根据罗宾逊-帕特曼法案的要求。作者表明，一般来说，不存在单一的两部分关税，每单位费用不变，这将重复行为结果，即，价格，数量和渠道利润，通过垂直整合系统获得;也就是说，渠道不能协调，除非在相同或非竞争零售商的琐碎情况下。然而，一个适当指定的数量折扣计划将使渠道赚取相同的利润产生的垂直一体化系统。条件下，制造商将更愿意提供各种两部分的关税与恒定的每单位费用，而不是渠道协调的数量折扣时间表。作者还建立了一个由两部分组成的关税菜单，它模仿了垂直一体化系统的所有结果。然而，只有在严格的条件下，零售商才会从菜单中选择适当的关税。当这些条件不满足时，信道比单一次优费率的情况更糟。研究还表明，在参数值范围很广的情况下，制造商将更愿意提供次优的两部分关税，而不是一个菜单的两部分关税，可以最大限度地提高渠道利润。
This paper explores channel coordination by a manufacturer that sells through competing retailers and that treats these retailers equally, as required by the Robinson-Patman Act. The authors show that, in general, there exists no single two-part tariff with a constant per-unit charge that will duplicate the behavioral results i.e., prices, quantities, and channel profits that are obtained by a vertically integrated system; that is, the channel cannot be coordinated except in the trivial cases of identical or noncompeting retailers. However, an appropriately specified quantity-discount schedule will enable the channel to earn the same profits generated by a vertically integrated system. Conditions are derived under which a manufacturer will prefer to offer various two-part tariffs with constant per-unit charges instead of the channel-coordinating quantity-discount schedule. The authors also establish the existence of a menu of two-part tariffs that mimics all results of a vertically integrated system. However, only under stringent conditions will retailers select the appropriate tariff from the menu. When these conditions are not satisfied, the channel is worse off than in the case of a single, second-best tariff. It is also demonstrated that under a wide range of parametric values the manufacturer will prefer to offer the second-best two-part tariff rather than a menu of two-part tariffs that could maximize channel profits.