Innovative Competition and Endogenous Monopoly——A Judging Principle of Chinese Anti-trust Law

Innovative Competition and Endogenous Monopoly——A Judging Principle of Chinese Anti-trust Law
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发表时间:
2011
期刊:
China Industrial Economy
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Zhu Wei-ping
Zhu Wei-ping
中科院分区:
其他
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作者:
Zhu Wei-ping

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创新与垄断的关系是经济学中最常被提及的话题,但现有的实证研究往往缺乏统计显著性或不稳健性。本文建立了企业创新竞争与古诺竞争的动态模型,模型表明,创新与垄断的关系随着产业的发展而动态变化。从长期的角度证明了熊彼特假说,指出垄断是市场机制和产业长期演进的内生结果,从长期来看,消费者剩余与社会福利是相互支持的,因此垄断对社会福利是有利的。本文认为,垄断是内生于市场还是外生于市场应是我国反垄断法的基本判断原则,如果一个公司通过其法律的经营和创新而获得垄断权,垄断权必须合法。
The relation between innovation and monopoly is the most referenced topic in economics,but the existing empirical study is always statistically insignificant or unrobust.The paper establishes a dynamic model on company's innovative competition and cournot competition.The model shows that,the relation between innovation and monopoly is on dynamic changing with industry's development,and then proves Schumpeterian hypothesis in long-term views.The paper also shows monopoly is a endogenous consequence of market mechanism and industrial long-term evolution.Monopoly,consumer-surplus and social welfare supported each other in long-term view.So monopoly is desirable to social welfare.Based on our research findings,we suggest that monopoly is endogenous or exogenous from market should be the fundamental judging principle of Chinese anti-trust law.If a company get monopoly power from its legal management and innovation,monopoly power should be legitimate.