Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance
Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance
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公共投资和所得税：再分配与生产绩效
DOI：
10.1007/s00712-005-0138-6
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Thomas Gaube
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Thomas Gaube
本文用最优所得税的静态两型自我选择模型来研究政府投资问题。结果表明，当公共投资对相对要素价格没有影响时，次优投资规则与有效生产是一致的。否则，再分配所得税意味着，只要提高（或降低）非熟练工人的工资率相对于熟练工人的工资率，最优投资支出就会超过（或低于）有效水平。
This paper deals with government investment in a static two-type self-selection model of optimum income taxation. It is shown that the second-best investment rule is consistent with efficient production, provided that public investment has no influence on relative factor prices. Otherwise, however, redistributive income taxation implies that optimal investment expenditures exceed (or fall below) the efficient level as long as they raise (or decrease) the wage rate of the unskilled individuals relative to the wage rate of the skilled individuals.