Comment on "Bank Competition and Access to Finance: International Evidence"

Comment on "Bank Competition and Access to Finance: International Evidence"
复制标题

对“银行竞争和融资渠道:国际证据”的评论

DOI:
10.1353/mcb.2004.0046
复制
发表时间:
2004
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
O. Ergungor
O. Ergungor
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
O. Ergungor

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

关于银行的市场支配力对企业获得信贷的影响,有两种普遍承认但相互矛盾的预测。结构-绩效假说认为,市场力量越大,价格越高,供应越少。相反,基于信息的假说认为,更多的市场力量会增加银行对信息不透明的借款人的贷款。在“银行竞争和融资渠道:国际证据”中,Beck,Demirguii-Kunt和Maksimovic(2004,本期JMCB)(以下简称BDM)研究了哪种假设能够经受住实证检验。这是一个永远不会令人失望的研究问题,因为无论最终哪种假设占上风,结果都很重要。这不是第一次在文献中讨论这个问题,但BDM对这个问题做了最全面的研究。发展中国家的政策制定者在为新兴银行市场制定政策时,不再主要依赖美国银行市场的结果。他们现在可以从74个国家的6000多家公司的经验中吸取教训。BDM的结果表明,在更集中的银行市场(高市场权力),企业面临更高的融资障碍。BDM将这一发现解释为支持结构-绩效假说的证据,并强调银行市场势力的负面影响。在我的评论中,我想重新解释这些结果,强调市场力量的积极影响,并对论文的方法表示一些关注。
There are two commonly acknowledged, albeit conflicting predictions on the effect of banks' market power on firms' access to credit. The structure-performance hypothesis asserts that more market power leads to lower supply at higher prices. In contrast, the information-based hypothesis asserts that more market power increases bank lending to informationally opaque borrowers. In "Bank Competition and Access to Finance: International Evidence," Beck, Demirguii-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004, this issue of JMCB) (henceforth BDM) investigate which hypothesis survives empirical scrutiny. This is a research question that will never disappoint, as the results will be important no matter which hypothesis prevails in the end. It is not the first time the question has been addressed in the literature, but BDM have made the most comprehensive study on this issue. Policymakers in developing countries no longer have to rely mostly on results from the U.S. banking market when they formulate policies for their emerging banking markets. They can now learn a lesson from the experience of more than 6000 companies in 74 countries. BDM's results suggest that in more concentrated banking markets (high market power), firms face higher financing obstacles. BDM interpret this finding as evidence in support of the structure-performance hypothesis and emphasize the negative effects of bank market power. In my comments, I would like to reinterpret these results, emphasizing the positive effects of market power, and express some concerns about the method of the paper.