Event-Triggered Watermarking Control to Handle Cyber-Physical Integrity Attacks
Event-Triggered Watermarking Control to Handle Cyber-Physical Integrity Attacks
复制标题
用于处理网络物理完整性攻击的事件触发水印控制
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-47560-8_1
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joaquín García
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
José Rubio;L. D. Cicco;Joaquín García
使用控制理论解决方案来检测针对网络物理系统的攻击是一个不断增长的研究领域。传统文献建议使用控制策略来保留，例如，当通信网络连接物理系统的分布式组件（例如，传感器、致动器和控制器）。然而，调整这些战略以处理安全事件是一个持续的挑战。在本文中，我们分析了使用基于水印的检测器，处理完整性攻击。我们表明：（1）检测器能够正常工作的对手使用非参数的方法逃避检测的存在下，但（2）它无法检测对手使用参数识别方法逃避检测。我们提出了一种新的策略，补充了基于水印的检测器，以检测两个对手。我们通过数值仿真验证了新策略的检测效率。
The use of control-theoretic solutions to detect attacks against cyber-physical systems is a growing area of research. Traditional literature proposes the use of control strategies to retain, f.i., satisfactory closed-loop performance, as well as safety properties, when a communication network connects the distributed components of a physical system (e.g., sensors, actuators, and controllers). However, the adaptation of these strategies to handle security incidents, is an ongoing challenge. In this paper, we analyze the use of a watermark-based detector that handles integrity attacks. We show that (1) the detector is able to work properly under the presence of adversaries using non-parametric methods to escape detection; but (2) it fails at detecting adversaries using parametric identification methods to escape detection. We propose a new strategy that complements the watermark-based detector in order to detect both adversaries. We validate the detection efficiency of the new strategy via numeric simulations.