Counter-RAPTOR: Safeguarding Tor Against Active Routing Attacks

Counter-RAPTOR: Safeguarding Tor Against Active Routing Attacks
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Counter-RAPTOR:保护 Tor 免受主动路由攻击

DOI:
10.1109/sp.2017.34
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Prateek Mittal
Prateek Mittal
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yixin Sun;A. Edmundson;N. Feamster;M. Chiang;Prateek Mittal

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Tor很容易受到网络级攻击者的攻击,他们可以观察到通信的两端,从而使用户去匿名化。最近的研究表明,Tor很容易受到以前未知的主动BGP路由攻击(称为RAPTOR攻击)的影响,这种攻击将Tor用户暴露给更多的网络级对手。在本文中,我们的目标是减轻和检测针对Tor的这种主动路由攻击。首先,我们提出了一种新的测量Tor网络对主动BGP前缀攻击的弹性的研究。我们表明,具有高Tor带宽的ase对攻击的弹性可能低于其他ase。其次,我们提出了一种新的Tor保护中继选择算法,该算法将中继的弹性考虑在内,以主动减轻此类攻击。我们表明,该算法成功地将Tor客户端的安全性平均提高了36%(某些客户端的安全性提高了166%)。最后,我们构建了一个实时BGP监控系统,该系统可以通过执行AS起源检查和新颖的检测分析来实时检测Tor网络上的路由异常。我们的监控系统成功地检测到模拟攻击,这些攻击是根据多种已知攻击类型建模的,以及真实世界的劫持攻击(由我们执行),同时具有低误报率。
Tor is vulnerable to network-level adversaries who can observe both ends of the communication to deanonymize users. Recent work has shown that Tor is susceptible to the previously unknown active BGP routing attacks, called RAPTOR attacks, which expose Tor users to more network-level adversaries. In this paper, we aim to mitigate and detect such active routing attacks against Tor. First, we present a new measurement study on the resilience of the Tor network to active BGP prefix attacks. We show that ASes with high Tor bandwidth can be less resilient to attacks than other ASes. Second, we present a new Tor guard relay selection algorithm that incorporates resilience of relays into consideration to proactively mitigate such attacks. We show that the algorithm successfully improves the security for Tor clients by up to 36% on average (up to 166% for certain clients). Finally, we build a live BGP monitoring system that can detect routing anomalies on the Tor network in real time by performing an AS origin check and novel detection analytics. Our monitoring system successfully detects simulated attacks that are modeled after multiple known attack types as well as a real-world hijack attack (performed by us), while having low false positive rates.
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DOI: 10.1515/popets-2016-0044
发表时间: 2016
影响因子: --
作者:
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通讯作者: Wright, Matthew