Hobbes's genealogy of private conscience
Hobbes's genealogy of private conscience
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霍布斯的私人良心谱系
DOI：
10.1111/ejop.12519
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Guido Frilli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Guido Frilli
这一贡献旨在重建霍布斯对私人良心语言的批判，并评估这种批判与霍布斯政治哲学的相关性。我认为，霍布斯从根本上颠覆了传统的道德神学的私人判断概念，把它变成了一个自然的和社会的事实：良心变成了一个共同的意见。这种激烈的重新定义使他能够谴责对良心语言的煽动性使用：我认为，霍布斯对天主教和长老会的批评可以被解读为对私人良心的宗谱分析的尝试。然而，尽管良心总是由强有力的修辞构成，但对霍布斯来说，良心并非无足轻重，因为它成为——以一种对霍布斯政治的“自由主义”和“绝对主义”解读都无法令人满意地解释的方式——政治同意构建的矛盾维度。
This contribution aims at reconstructing Hobbes's critique of the language of private conscience and at evaluating the relevance of this critique for Hobbes's political philosophy. Hobbes, I argue, radically subverts the traditional moral‐theological notion of private judgment by turning it into a natural and social fact: conscience becomes nothing more than a shared opinion. This drastic redefinition allows him to condemn the seditious uses of the language of conscience: Hobbes's criticism of Papists and Presbyterians can be read, I contend, as an attempt at a genealogical analysis of private conscience. Yet, while always constructed by powerful rhetoric, conscience is not insignificant to Hobbes, since it becomes—in a way that neither “liberal” nor “absolutist” readings of Hobbes's politics have satisfactorily accounted for—the ambivalent dimension of the construction of political consent.