State power in a multilateral context: Voting strength in the Asian development bank
State power in a multilateral context: Voting strength in the Asian development bank
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DOI：
10.1080/03050629908434952
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发表时间：
1999-09
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
J. Strand
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Strand
本文评估了亚洲开发银行(ADB)的加权投票如何影响其董事会成员影响获胜联盟的形成的能力。投票权重不足以衡量行为者影响结果的能力，因为它们既没有考虑可能形成的联盟数量，也没有考虑通过决议所需的票数。简而言之，加权投票制度不能直接参照投票权重进行分析，而是需要确定。相对投票权。使用约翰斯顿投票权指数，从1980年开始的四个时间点显示所有成员的值。结果显示，不出所料，美国和日本拥有最大的投票权百分比。同样，正如预期的那样，大多数借款成员在董事会中没有投票权。出乎意料的是，在组成董事会的财团中，出现了一种独裁者的模式，即一些成员能够…
This article assesses how weighted voting in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) impacts members’ abilities to influence the formation of winning coalitions in its Board of Directors. Voting weights do not adequately measure an actor's ability to affect outcomes because they do not account for either the possible number of coalitions that may form or the number of votes needed to pass a resolution. In short, weighted voting systems cannot be straightforwardly analyzed with reference to voting weights but instead require the determination of . relative voting power. Using the Johnston index of voting power, values are presented for all members at four time points starting in 1980. Results indicate that the United States and Japan, as expected, hold the largest percentages of voting power. Also as expected, most borrowing members do not hold voting power in the Board of Directors. Unexpectedly, there is a pattern of dictators in the syndicates that comprise the Board of Directors whereby some members are able ...