Avoiding the prisoner's dilemma in auction-based negotiations for highly rugged utility spaces
Avoiding the prisoner's dilemma in auction-based negotiations for highly rugged utility spaces
复制标题
在高度崎岖的公用空间的拍卖谈判中避免囚徒困境
DOI：
10.1145/1838206.1838266
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Enrique de la Hoz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ivan Marsá;Miguel A. López;J. Velasco;Enrique de la Hoz
最近有一些研究项目涉及在高度坚固的公用事业空间中进行复杂的谈判。然而，他们中的大多数人都专注于克服由场景的复杂性所带来的问题，而没有分析他们提出的模型中代理人的策略行为。分析动态的谈判过程中，不同策略的代理人相互作用是必要的，以将这些模型应用到真实的，竞争的环境中，代理人不能以相同的方式行事。特别有问题的是像著名的囚徒困境，或更一般的情况下，无政府状态的高代价的情况。这些情况意味着，个人的理性驱使代理人对战略，产生低的个人和社会福利。在高度粗糙的场景中，这种情况通常会使代理无法达成协议，因此应该设计协商机制来避免它们。本文对一个基于拍卖的谈判模型进行了策略分析，揭示了该方法容易陷入囚徒困境。此外，一组技术来解决这个问题，并进行了实验评估，以验证所提出的方法，以提高谈判过程的战略稳定性的充分性。
There is a number of recent research lines addressing complex negotiations in highly rugged utility spaces. However, most of them focus on overcoming the problems imposed by the complexity of the scenario, without analyzing the strategic behavior of the agents in the models they propose. Analyzing the dynamics of the negotiation process when agents with different strategies interact is necessary to apply these models to real, competitive environments, where agents cannot be supposed to behave in the same way. Specially problematic are situations like the well-known prisoner's dilemma, or more generally, situations of high price of anarchy. These situations imply that individual rationality drives the agents towards strategies which yield low individual and social welfares. In highly rugged scenarios, such situations usually make agents fail to reach an agreement, and therefore negotiation mechanisms should be designed to avoid them. This paper performs a strategy analysis of an auction-based negotiation model designed for highly rugged scenarios, revealing that the approach is prone to the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, a set of techniques to solve this problem are proposed, and an experimental evaluation is performed to validate the adequacy of the proposed approaches to improve the strategic stability of the negotiation process.
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007-01
期刊：
--
影响因子：
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作者：
Takayuki Ito;Hiromitsu Hattori;M. Klein
通讯作者：
Takayuki Ito;Hiromitsu Hattori;M. Klein