Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries
Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries
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DOI：
10.1098/rstb.2004.1569
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发表时间：
2005-01-29
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
Parma, AM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hilborn, R;Orensanz, JM;Parma, AM
世界各地的渔业是通过广泛的体制结构管理的。其中一些是相当灾难性的，而另一些则被证明在生物学和经济学上都是成功的。不成功的系统通常涉及开放获取，试图自上而下控制，但监测和执行规章的能力很差，或者依赖共识。成功的制度包括地方合作社、政府的强有力控制以及各种形式的产权，但通常都涉及向个体经营者提供奖励的体制制度，这些制度促使个体经营者采取符合养护的行为。
Fisheries around the world are managed with a broad range of institutional structures. Some of these have been quite disastrous, whereas others have proven both biologically and economically successful. Unsuccessful systems have generally involved either open access, attempts at top-down control with poor ability to monitor and implement regulations, or reliance on consensus. Successful systems range from local cooperatives to strong governmental control, to various forms of property rights, but usually involve institutional systems that provide incentives to individual operators that lead to behaviour consistent with conservation.