The Arrow Effect under Competitive R&D
The Arrow Effect under Competitive R&D
复制标题
竞争R下的箭头效应
DOI：
10.2202/1935-1690.1215
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Cozzi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Cozzi
本文表明，标准的熊彼特理论并不意味着现任垄断者有太少的动机进行R&D旨在取代自己的产品。如果专利保持器持有者和其他研发投资者一样是理性的，那么她就会知道，在均衡状态下，她的专利权的失效不会受到她自己的研发投资的影响，因为所有的研发公司都是在完全竞争和私人层面上的规模收益不变的情况下运作的。这就调和了熊彼特理论与现有企业创新的经验证据。证明了通常的宏观经济含义保持其有效性。
This paper shows that standard Schumpeterian theory does not imply that the incumbent monopolist has too little incentive to carry out R&D aimed at displacing its own product. If the patent holder is rational as is any other R&D investor, she will know that in equilibrium her patents obsolescence shall not be affected by her own R&D investment, because all the R&D firms operate under perfect competition and constant returns to scale at the private level. This reconciles Schumpeterian theory with the empirical evidence on innovation by incumbents. It is proved that the usual macroeconomic implications maintain their validity.