Perception and Belief
Perception and Belief
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感知和信念
DOI：
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00057.x
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. D. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. D. Smith
试图查明感知与信念的关系。虽然，出于熟悉的原因，说我们一定相信我们所感知的对象的存在，或者说它们实际上具有它们的表面特征，这是不正确的，但有人认为，感知和信念之间的关系不仅仅是偶然的。
有两个主要问题需要解决。第一个是“附带”信念可能阻碍知觉信念。有人认为，这仍然分配了一个重要的作用，相信知觉，虽然信仰可能是一个衰减的形式。第二个是弗雷德·德雷茨克的主张，即即使是减弱的信念也可能完全不存在于知觉中。有人认为：（a）“非认识性”感知只能通过使用“认识性”感知的概念来理解;（B）前者只能部分发生--即，（3）通过将注意力从对对象的知觉转移到现象学传统对世界知觉的关注，我们可以看到知觉必须完全渗透着“doxastic”力量。
An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent
There are two main issues to address. the first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) ‘non-epistemic’perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’force.