Delivering the Goods: Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional Settings
Delivering the Goods: Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional Settings
复制标题
交付成果：不同选举和制度背景下的立法特殊主义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Scott Ashworth;Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
我们分析了一个模型的立法特殊性，了解如何提供选区服务的变化，在制度和选举环境。我们发现，在选民中，单一成员区，独立的行政人员增加党派平衡都增加了激励立法者提供选区服务。该模型的结果与现有的比较机构的经验观察是一致的。此外，该模型解决了美国现有模型无法解释的一段时间内的趋势，并产生了新的假设，这些假设适合于实证评估。
We analyze a model of legislative particularism to understand how the provision of constituency service responds to variations in institutional and electoral environments. We show that increased partisan balance in the electorate, single-member districts, and independent executives all increase incentives for legislators to provide constituency service. The results of the model are consistent with existing comparative-institutional empirical observations. Moreover, the model addresses over time trends in the United States that are not explained by existing models and yields novel hypotheses that are amenable to empirical evaluation.