Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures under Restricted Coalitional Changes
Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures under Restricted Coalitional Changes
复制标题
有限联盟变革下的相继稳定的联盟结构
DOI：
10.1142/s0219198914500066
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
T.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Funaki;Y. and Yamato;T.
本文研究了在联盟形成博弈中，有远见的参与者是否能形成有效的大联盟结构。我们提出了一个联盟结构的稳定性概念，称为顺序稳定性，当两个独立的联盟由于高谈判成本而只有双边合并是可行的。给出了一种检验大联盟结构序列稳定性的算法，并给出了有效大联盟结构序列稳定的充分条件。我们还用公共资源博弈和古诺寡头博弈来说明我们的结果。
In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, calledsequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.