The MaTerIal PreSeNce Of The PaST
The MaTerIal PreSeNce Of The PaST
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过去的物质存在
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发表时间：
2006
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通讯作者：
eWa DOMaNSka
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作者：
eWa DOMaNSka
这篇文章涉及过去的物质存在和最近在人文科学中呼吁“回归事物”。这种对事物的重新兴趣标志着对建构主义和文本主义的拒绝，以及对“真实的”的渴望，其中“重新获得”对象被认为是重新建立与现实联系的手段。在这一转向的背景下，我们不妨重新考虑过去遗物的（本体论）地位及其在有机与无机、人与物以及各种事物本身之间的中介关系中的作用，以重新概念化对过去的研究。我认为，未来将取决于对过去感兴趣的各种学者是否以及如何设法修改他们对过去物质残留物的理解，即事物以及人类，动物和植物的残留物。在讨论这个问题时，我将参考马丁海德格尔对客体和事物的区分，布鲁诺拉图尔关于事物的能动性和面向客体的民主的思想，以及唐伊德的物质解释学。为了说明我的论点，我将集中在阿根廷失踪者（死的或活的）的矛盾状态的一些例子，它抵制在场与缺席的对立结构。在这种情况下，消失的身体是过去本身的一种范式，它既与现在连续，又与现在不连续，既存在又不存在。由于没有足够的术语来分析“矛盾”或异常状态的现在-缺席的二分法，我寻找他们以外的二元对立，传统上用来概念化的现在-缺席的关系，在我们思考过去。为了这个目的，我使用了阿尔吉尔达斯·朱利安·格雷马斯的符号学方阵。近几十年来，我们倾向于从表征的角度来思考过去的存在，但存在可能是从一种新兴的新范式中考虑的，这种范式提供了一种可行的替代表征的方法。为了证明这一点，我将考虑存在的空间维度--一个在我面前的存在，一个事物的存在。我主张，虽然从表征转向在场标志着我们注意力焦点的变化，但它不一定是表征的替代品。关注存在反映了在仅仅是理智的考虑无法改变世界时采取具体行动的必要性。因此，我将把注意力集中在过去事物的物质存在上。我试图在符号学、话语理论或表征理论之外的背景下重新思考过去痕迹的物质方面，并将这些痕迹的分析集中在被传统来源概念边缘化或忽视的方面。也就是说，我的意思是关注痕迹的物质性和实物性，而不是它的文本性和内容。
This article deals with the material presence of the past and the recent call in the human sciences for a “return to things.” This renewed interest in things signals a rejection of constructivism and textualism and the longing for what is “real,” where “regaining” the object is conceived as a means for re-establishing contact with reality. In the context of this turn, we might wish to reconsider the (ontological) status of relics of the past and their function in mediating relations between the organic and the inorganic, between people and things, and among various kinds of things themselves for reconceptualizing the study of the past. I argue that the future will depend on whether and how various scholars interested in the past manage to modify their understanding of the material remnants of the past, that is, things as well as human, animal, and plant remains. In discussing this problem I will refer to Martin heidegger’s distinction between an object and a thing, to bruno latour’s idea of the agency of things and object-oriented democracy, and to Don Ihde’s material hermeneutics. To illustrate my argument I will focus on some examples of the ambivalent status of the disappeared person (dead or alive) in argentina, which resists the oppositional structure of present versus absent. In this context, the disappeared body is a paradigm of the past itself, which is both continuous with the present and discontinuous from it, which simultaneously is and is not. Since there are no adequate terms to analyze the “contradictory” or anomalous status of the present–absent dichotomy, I look for them outside the binary oppositions conventionally used to conceptualize the present–absent relationship in our thinking about the past. for this purpose I employ algirdas Julien Greimas’s semiotic square. In recent decades we have tended to think about the presence of the past in terms of representation, but presence might be considered from within an emerging new paradigm that offers a viable alternative to representation. To show this I will consider the spatial dimension of presence—a presence that is in front of me, a presence of things. I will claim that, while a turn from representation to presence marks a change in our focus of attention, it is not necessarily an alternative to representation. Attending to presence reflects a need for concrete actions when merely intellectual considerations fail to effect changes in the world. Thus, I will focus my attention on the material presence of the past—on things. I am trying to rethink the material aspect of traces of the past in a context other than semiotics, discourse theory, or representation theory, and to focus the analysis of those traces on an aspect that is marginalized or neglected by traditional notions of the source. That is, I mean to focus on the materiality and thingness of the trace rather than on its textuality and content.