DECISION-MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
复制标题
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordjournals.bmb.a070277
复制
发表时间：
1964-01-01
影响因子：
6.7
通讯作者：
AUDLEY, RJ
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
AUDLEY, RJ
在许多心理实验中，受试者需要从多种选择中选择一种行动方案。在学习研究中，动物受试者可能会面临两扇设计不同的门，其中只有一扇始终与奖励相关。在研究绝对听力阈值的人类受试者中，可能会被要求指定他在两个连续时间间隔中的哪一个时间间隔中听到通过耳机向他播放微弱的音调。有时，主题可用的替代方案可能不会像这些示例中那样明确提供。在记忆研究中可能会出现这种情况，当某人试图回忆最近获得的不熟悉物体的名称时，其他最近学习的标签会与其竞争记忆。这些例子说明了为什么决策始终是心理学家关注的一个主要问题，而不是它可能具有的任何内在兴趣；所涉及的过程是心理学家获得有关行为控制过程的事实的实验方法的重要组成部分。1．关于做出理性决策的理论 那些对人类和动物选择知识做出最大贡献的人可能会认为本文的标题过于雄心勃勃（对早期工作的详细回顾，请参见 Johnson，1955）。但近年来，越来越多的人倾向于将心理学之外发展起来的某些理论概念应用于选择问题。这些概念涉及在特定情况下如何合理地做出决策。尽管许多此类早期建议是由经济学家提出的，但后来的大部分工作都源自冯·诺依曼和摩根斯坦（1911）提出的数学“博弈论”（由威廉姆斯阐述，1954）。心理学也利用博弈论的扩展来涵盖由Wald（1950）独立发展的统计决策理论（由Chernoff＆Moses阐述，1959）。 Edwards (1954, 1961) 对相关文献进行了精彩的评论。正是这些做出理性选择的方案导致了目前“决策”一词的使用。一些心理学家，包括我自己，并不特别喜欢这些方案所暗示的“理性”概念。
In many psychological experiments the subject is required to select one course of action from among a number of alternatives. The animal subject in a study of learning may be faced with two doors bearing different designs, only one of which has always been associated with reward. The human subject in a study of the absolute threshold for hearing may be asked to specify in which of two successive intervals of time he heard a weak tone played to him through ear-phones. Sometimes the alternatives available to the subject may not be so explicitly provided as they are in these examples. This might be the case in a study of memory when someone is trying to recall the recently acquired name for an unfamiliar object, and other recently learned tags compete with it for recollection. These examples give the reason why decision-making has always been a major concern of psychologists over and above any intrinsic interest it may have; the processes involved are part and parcel of the psychologist's experimental methods for obtaining facts about the processes governing behaviour.1. Theories about Making Rational Decisions It is likely that those who have contributed most to our knowledge of human and animal choice would consider that the title of the present paper was altogether too ambitious (for a good review of earlier work see Johnson, 1955). But in recent years there has been a growing tendency to apply to the problems of choice certain theoretical notions which have developed outside psychology. These notions are concerned with how decisions ought rationally to be made in specified circumstances. Although many early proposals of this kind were developed by economists, most of the later work is derived from the mathematical" theory of games" presented by von Neumann & Morgenstem (1911)(expounded by Williams, 1954). Use has also been made in psychology of the extension of the theory of games to cover statistical decision theory which was independently developed by Wald (1950)(expounded by Chernoff & Moses, 1959). Excellent reviews of the relevant literature have been prepared by Edwards (1954, 1961). It is these schemes for making rational choices that have led to the current use of the teim" decision-making". Some psychologists, including myself, do not particularly like the notion of a" rationalmqn" which these schemes imply.