Doing Without Believing Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution
Doing Without Believing Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution
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不相信理智主义、知识方法和信仰归因
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发表时间：
2016
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通讯作者：
J. Russo
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作者：
P. G. Gutiérrez Diez;Yanrong Su;J. Russo
我们考虑了一系列的情况--包括假设的和实际的--在这些情况下，行动者显然知道如何φ，但不相信他们实际上φ的方式是他们φ的一种方式。这些“无信仰”的案例为知性主义提出了一个关于知识如何的初步问题。问题是这样的：如果知识包含信念，如果知道如何φ只是知道某个w是一个人达到φ的一种方式，那么一个主体不能既知道如何φ，又不相信w，她达到φ的方式，是她达到φ的一种方式。我们讨论了各种方式，知识分子可能会回应这一挑战，并认为，最终，这场辩论收敛与另一个，似乎不同的辩论在当代认识论：如何属性的信念之间的冲突的情况下，代理人的声明和她的行为。无信仰的情况下，我们认为，揭示了如何知性依赖于假定的东西，如“隐式的信念”的可解释性-这与代理人的公开信仰冲突-在许多情况下，明显的知识如何。虽然可能有很好的理由在其他地方排除隐含的信念，但我们认为，至少有一些理由认为，这些理由不能延续到无信念的情况下，从而对知性主义施加新的压力。
We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to φ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact φ is a way for them to φ. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to φ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to φ, then an agent cannot both know how to φ and fail to believe that w , the way that she φs, is a way for her to φ. We discuss a variety of ways in which Intellectualists might respond to this challenge and argue that, ultimately, this debate converges with another, seemingly distinct debate in contemporary epistemology: how to attribute belief in cases of conflict between an agent’s avowals and her behavior. No-belief cases, we argue, reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility of positing something like “implicit beliefs”—which conflict with an agent’s avowed beliefs—in many cases of apparent knowledge-how. While there may be good reason to posit implicit beliefs elsewhere, we suggest that there are at least some grounds for thinking that these reasons fail to carry over to no-belief cases, thus applying new pressure to Intellectualism.