An enactivist account of the dynamics of lying
An enactivist account of the dynamics of lying
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DOI：
10.1177/10597123231166421
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发表时间：
2023-04
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Christian Kronsted;S. Gallagher;Deborah Tollefsen;L. Windsor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Christian Kronsted;S. Gallagher;Deborah Tollefsen;L. Windsor
行动主义者对沟通的描述几乎完全集中在诚实、合作的沟通上。然而，人类生活中的许多事情都涉及欺骗和谎言。使用普遍同意的定义说谎，我们在这里开发一个互动帐户的动态说谎。从表面上看，说谎给认知的生成理论带来了一个问题，因为说谎似乎需要表现反事实状态的能力，并将这些表现植入其他主体的信念系统中。在我们看来，说谎涉及到对社会认知系统的短期和长期动态的主动操纵，这样行为人就可以获得与他们在没有谎言的情况下所获得的相反的一组启示。在社会文化和物质实践中，代表真理和谎言的能力被取代。
Enactivist accounts of communication have focused almost exclusively on honest, cooperative communication. However, much of human life involves deception and lies. Using the generally agreed upon definition of lying, we here develop an enactive account of the dynamics of lying. At face, lying poses a problem for enactive theories of cognition since lying seemingly requires the ability to represent counterfactual states of affairs and implant those representations in other agents' belief systems. On our account, lying involves the active manipulation of the short- and long-term dynamics of social cognitive systems so that agents have access to different sets of affordances from the one’s they counterfactually would have had access to without the lie. Representing truths and falsehoods are replaced with competency within social-cultural and material practices.