Secondary Users Entering the Pool: A Joint Optimization Framework for Spectrum Pooling
Secondary Users Entering the Pool: A Joint Optimization Framework for Spectrum Pooling
复制标题
二级用户入池：频谱池联合优化框架
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
16.4
通讯作者：
Kwang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yong Xiao;D. Niyato;Zhu Han;Kwang
频谱池已经被证明具有提高频谱利用率的巨大潜力，特别是当主用户（PU）和次用户（SU）被允许使用公共频谱池时。本文研究了一个同时具有处理单元和服务单元的频谱池系统的联合优化问题。我们开发了一个新的层次博弈模型，其中包括一个重叠的联盟形成博弈模型来分析定价合作/竞争策略之间的PU和非合作博弈模型来研究SU之间的资源竞争。这两个博弈模型是相互关联的层次博弈结构，在其中，我们还研究了SU和PU之间的相互作用。我们的模型不要求SU具有关于PU的频谱接入调度的信息。此外，我们提出了一个简单的分布式联合优化算法，可以优化的联盟形成的PU以及子带分配和发送功率的SU。为了研究不同的公平标准及其对PU之间的收益分配的影响，我们推导了两种流行的公平标准，即纳什谈判解和Shapley值公平的最优收益分配方案。
Spectrum pooling has been shown to have a great potential to improve the spectrum utilization, especially when primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) are allowed to utilize a common spectrum pool. This paper studies the joint optimization problem for a spectrum pooling system with both PUs and SUs. We develop a novel hierarchical game theoretic model which consists of an overlapped coalition formation game model to analyze the pricing cooperation/competition strategy among PUs and a non-cooperative game model to investigate the resource competition among SUs. These two game models are interrelated in a hierarchical game structure, in which we also study the interaction between SUs and PUs. Our model does not require SUs to have information about spectrum access scheduling of PUs. Furthermore, we propose a simple distributed joint optimization algorithm that can optimize the coalition formation of PUs as well as the sub-band allocation and transmit powers of SUs. To study different fairness criteria and their effects on the payoff divisions among PUs, we derive the optimal payoff division schemes of two popular fairness criteria, namely Nash bargaining solution and Shapley value fairness.