Correlated equilibrium and concave games
Correlated equilibrium and concave games
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DOI：
10.1007/s00182-007-0098-x
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发表时间：
2008-04
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Takashi Ui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takashi Ui
本文证明了如果一个博弈满足罗森（Econometrica 33：520，1965）给出的纯策略纳什均衡存在唯一的充分条件，那么这个博弈有唯一的相关均衡，它使唯一的纯策略纳什均衡的概率为1。此外，它表明，一个较弱的条件足以为唯一性的相关平衡。该条件推广了Neyman（Int J Game Theory 26：223，1997）为具有严格凹势函数的势博弈提供的相关均衡唯一性的充分条件。
This paper shows that if a game satisfies the sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium provided by Rosen (Econometrica 33:520, 1965), then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, it shows that a weaker condition suffices for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium. The condition generalizes the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium provided by Neyman (Int J Game Theory 26:223, 1997) for a potential game with a strictly concave potential function.