The Pluralism of Pluralism: An Anti-Theory?
The Pluralism of Pluralism: An Anti-Theory?
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多元主义的多元主义:反理论?
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-9248.1990.tb01494.x
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发表时间:
1990
影响因子:
3.1
通讯作者:
Grant Jordan
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Grant Jordan
The initial purpose of this paper is simply to define, if possible, the term ‘pluralism’. It starts from the assumption that pluralism has been an underexplicit theory; an evolving or (less flatteringly) a mutating theory; an inconsistent theory. These inconstant qualities perhaps explain why pluralism has been ‘in the ring’ with such different alternatives as elitism, corporatism and totalitarianism. Thus the first issue is whether or not it is possible to recognize pluralism. Is there an agreed description of the suspect? Since pluralism is so vague a set ofideas it is difficult to understand how opponents can have rejected it with such confidence. It is also suggested that pluralism has been a lucky theory to the extent that the empirical developments of the past decades make pluralism a more tenable option than it was in the 1950s. Pluralism also looks more respectable in the 1980s than the 1950s as the idea of the ‘market’ has regained popularity. However, although this paper seeks to restore pluralist sources to the centre of the discipline it is not argued that as they stand they offer a satisfactory and final account of how decisions are made in western democratic societies. The work is surprisingly patchy, even when approached sympathetically. It needs integration and development. Moreover, apart from the quality of the pluralist accounts, there is a separate issue of whether any single model is likely to be adequate. This is not to say that there is an obviously superior account with which to replace pluralism, but to express suspicion of the notion that we should expect to find any adequate model that does not feature explicit variety as its core.