When does government limit the impact of voter initiatives? The politics of implementation and enforcement
When does government limit the impact of voter initiatives? The politics of implementation and enforcement
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DOI：
10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00141.x
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发表时间：
2004-02-01
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
McCubbins, MD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gerber, ER;Lupia, A;McCubbins, MD
在许多州和地方，公民通过倡议制定法律。然而，许多成功的倡议后来被忽视或被大幅改变。为什么?我们的答案来自于主动性过程中被低估的两个方面。首先，许多倡议包含强大的政府行为体曾经阻止通过传统立法渠道通过的政策。其次，实施可能需要这些参与者遵守他们曾经反对的政策。那么问题就变成了：政府行为体什么时候会遵从获胜的倡议？我们运用一个模型和实例来厘清选举后的主动服从政治。我们的研究结果反驳了关于倡议如何改变公共政策的传统解释。
In many states and localities, citizens make laws by initiative. Many winning initiatives, however, are later ignored or altered substantially. Why? Our answer emerges from two underappreciated aspects of the initiative process. First, many initiatives contain policies that powerful governmental actors once prevented from passing via traditional legislative channels. Second, implementation can require these actors to comply with policies they once opposed. The question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We use a model and examples to clarify the post-election politics of initiative compliance. Our findings defy conventional explanations of how initiatives change public policy.