Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes
Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes
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DOI：
10.1007/s11127-016-0387-7
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发表时间：
2016-11
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
N. Mizuno;Katsuyuki Naito;Ryosuke Okazawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Mizuno;Katsuyuki Naito;Ryosuke Okazawa
这项研究考察了非民主政权中收入不平等对经济增长的影响。我们提供了一个模型，在这个模型中，自利的统治者选择一个约束他或她的政策选择的机构。统治者必须关心公民的支持程度，才能继续掌权。在采掘型制度下，统治者可以榨取公民财富的很大一部分，但由于公众支持率较低，面临失去权力的可能性很高。我们表明，不平等影响了统治者在侵占公民财富和掌握权力之间的权衡。公民之间的严重不平等使得对统治者的支持在他或她的制度选择方面缺乏弹性。因此，统治者选择了一个采掘型机构，这阻碍了投资和增长。这些结果解释了不平等与增长之间的负关系以及不平等与制度质量之间的负关系，这两种关系都在非民主国家中观察到。
This study investigates the effect of income inequality on economic growth in nondemocratic regimes. We provide a model in which a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that constrains his or her policy choice. The ruler must care about the extent of citizens’ support in order to remain in power. Under an extractive institution, the ruler can extract a large share of citizens’ wealth, but faces a high probability of losing power because of low public support. We show that inequality affects the ruler’s tradeoff between the expropriation of citizens’ wealth and his or her hold on power. Substantial inequality among citizens makes support for the ruler inelastic with respect to his or her institutional choice. The ruler therefore chooses an extractive institution, which impedes investment and growth. These results provide an explanation for the negative relationship between inequality and growth as well as the negative relationship between inequality and institutional quality, both of which are observed in nondemocratic countries.