Optimal Education Policies Under an Equity–Efficiency Trade-Off
Optimal Education Policies Under an Equity–Efficiency Trade-Off
复制标题
公平与效率权衡下的最优教育政策
DOI：
10.1016/s0573-8555(07)81009-1
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Takashi Oshio
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takashi Oshio
人们普遍认为，教育是使个人有平等机会提高其生产力和增加其未来收入的一种手段，人们认为，教育的积极外部效应证明有理由由政府提供教育。事实上，政府在提供和资助教育方面发挥着重要作用。然而，公共教育具有收入分配的模糊特征：从相同的公共教育投入中，能力较高的个人可以获得更多的教育产出和未来收入。如果出现这种情况，即使个人平均收入增加，统一提供公共教育也会扩大收入不平等。事实上，阿罗（Arrow，1971）、布鲁诺（Bruno，1976）和乌尔夫（Ulph，1977）提出了关于公共教育再分配效应的大量文献，他们讨论了在什么条件下，将更多支出用于能力更强的个人的“投入-回归”教育政策是合理的。Lommerud（1989）指出，对最有能力的个人的补贴是最优的，强调补贴可以恢复个人接受高等教育的激励，这种激励被累进所得税削弱了。De Fraja（2002年）在家庭收入和子女能力不同的框架内得出了精英教育政策的最优性。还通过其他方法审查了教育的再分配方面。其中，Hanushek、Leung和Yilmaz（2003）从公平性和效率两个方面比较了政府对教育的补贴和其他再分配手段，尽管他们假设补贴是统一的，而不考虑每个人的能力。Dur and Teulings（2003）表明，教育系统补贴和累进税的结合增加了社会福利。
Education is widely considered to be a means for giving individuals an equal opportunity to improve their productivity and increase their future earnings, and the positive external effects of education are believed to justify its public provision. In fact, the government plays a significant role in providing and financing education in every country. Public education, however, has an ambiguous feature of income distribution: Higher-ability individuals can receive more gains in educational output and future income than lower-ability individuals from the same input of public education. If that occurs, the uniform provision of public education can widen income inequality even if average income rises among individuals. Indeed, an extensive literature exists on the redistributive effects of public education, initiated by Arrow (1971), Bruno (1976), and Ulph (1977), who discuss under what conditions ‘‘input-regressive’’educational policies, which direct more expenditure to higher-ability individuals, can be justified. Lommerud (1989) has shown that subsidies to the most able individuals are optimal, stressing that they can restore the individuals’ incentive to receive higher education, which is blunted by progressive income taxation. De Fraja (2002) derives the optimality of an elitist education policy within a framework where households differ in their incomes and in their children’s abilities. The redistributive aspects of education have also been examined through other approaches. Among others, Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003) compare a government subsidy for education with alternative redistribution devices in terms of both equity and efficiency, although they assume a uniform subsidy regardless of each individual’s ability. Dur and Teulings (2003) show that a combination of education-system subsidy and progressive taxation increases social welfare.