The choice of network compatibility in two-sided markets
The choice of network compatibility in two-sided markets
复制标题
双边市场网络兼容性的选择
DOI：
10.1080/13504851.2022.2044009
复制
发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Kitamura Ryoma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kubota Hiroyuki;Shintani Mototsugu;羽田尚子;八田 達夫・田村 一軌;Kitamura Ryoma
我认为一个双寡头平台竞争中，（一）平台被视为异构的两组代理，卖方可以选择多个平台;（二）买方有一个网络的好处，从自己的平台，和部分网络的好处，从平台的兼容性;和（三）平台确定的程度，网络的兼容性纳什讨价还价。在对称均衡中，网络兼容度随着网络效应程度的增加或平台对卖家的差异化程度的降低而增加。此外，从社会规划者的角度来看，这是过度的，消费者希望不兼容。
I consider a duopolistic platform competition in which (i) platforms are viewed as heterogeneous by both groups of agents, and sellers can choose multiple platforms; (ii) buyers have a network benefit from their own platform, and a partial network benefit from platform compatibility; and (iii) platforms determine the degree of network compatibility by Nash bargaining. In symmetric equilibrium, the degree of network compatibility increases when the degree of network effect increases or the degree of differentiation of the platform for sellers decreases. Moreover, it is excessive from a social planner’s viewpoint, and incompatibility is desirable for consumers.