Auction-based P2P VoD streaming: Incentives and optimal scheduling

Auction-based P2P VoD streaming: Incentives and optimal scheduling
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DOI:
10.1145/2089085.2089091
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发表时间:
2012-02
期刊:
ACM Trans. Multim. Comput. Commun. Appl.
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Chuan Wu;Zongpeng Li;Xuanjia Qiu;F. Lau
Chuan Wu;Zongpeng Li;Xuanjia Qiu;F. Lau
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Chuan Wu;Zongpeng Li;Xuanjia Qiu;F. Lau

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现实世界中的大规模点对点(P2P)视频点播(VoD)流媒体应用与P2P直播流媒体相比面临着更多的设计挑战,这是由于更高的对等动态和更少的缓冲区重叠。当我们考虑到同伴的自私本性时,情况就变得更加复杂了,他们通常希望下载更多,上传更少,除非有其他动机。从分布式动态拍卖的新视角出发,设计了高效的P2P视频点播流媒体算法,同时考虑了对等激励和流媒体最优性。在我们的解决方案中,对等体之间的媒体区块交换是通过本地拍卖进行的,在本地拍卖中,预算受限的对等体从邻居那里竞标所需的区块,而邻居又将区块交付给中标者并收取收入。通过卖方保留的判别性二次竞价策略设计,供给对等体有充分动机最大限度地贡献其带宽以增加预算;请求节点也被激励以这样一种方式出价,即以完全分散的方式有效地实现最佳媒体块调度。运用凸优化和机制设计的方法,证明了诱导媒体块调度在社会福利最大化方面的最优性,证明了诱导媒体块调度在买卖节点上的激励相容性。本文通过大规模的实证研究,探讨了基于现实环境的动态P2P视频点播系统中所提出的拍卖机制的行为。
Real-world large-scale Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Video-on-Demand (VoD) streaming applications face more design challenges as compared to P2P live streaming, due to higher peer dynamics and less buffer overlap. The situation is further complicated when we consider the selfish nature of peers, who in general wish to download more and upload less, unless otherwise motivated. Taking a new perspective of distributed dynamic auctions, we design efficient P2P VoD streaming algorithms with simultaneous consideration of peer incentives and streaming optimality. In our solution, media block exchanges among peers are carried out through local auctions, in which budget-constrained peers bid for desired blocks from their neighbors, which in turn deliver blocks to the winning bidders and collect revenue. With strategic design of a discriminative second price auction with seller reservation, a supplying peer has full incentive to maximally contribute its bandwidth to increase its budget; requesting peers are also motivated to bid in such a way that optimal media block scheduling is achieved effectively in a fully decentralized fashion. Applying techniques from convex optimization and mechanism design, we prove (a) the incentive compatibility at the selling and buying peers, and (b) the optimality of the induced media block scheduling in terms of social welfare maximization. Large-scale empirical studies are conducted to investigate the behavior of the proposed auction mechanisms in dynamic P2P VoD systems based on real-world settings.