Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?
Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?
复制标题
为什么否决者不使用他们的权力？
DOI：
10.1177/1465116509346780
复制
发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Dirk Junge
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. König;Dirk Junge
为什么拥有否决权的成员国通常支持欧盟委员会倡议提出的政策变化，而它们自己的立场更接近现状？为什么我们经常在理事会中看到共识，而很少看到在新成员国或欧洲议会等额外的否决者通过欧盟（EU）的立法决策增加了对政策变化的限制后，委员会的倡议遭到拒绝？为了回答这些问题，本研究调查了成员国对48项委员会提案的投票偏好和投票机会。我们发现，从委员会的每一项倡议中得出投票偏好的模式几乎无法解释理事会的共识。一个原因是，欧盟委员会试图通过提出成员国赞成朝同一方向改变政策的建议，避免理事会分裂。当成员国仍然争议的政策变化的大小，我们表明，他们可以找到一个解决方案，从属于同一政策领域或在同一时期谈判的提案中互惠互利。因此，跨期和特定领域的互投赞成票可以为共识提供强有力的解释，即使在有争议的理事会中。
Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.