Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism?
Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism?
复制标题
选举竞争能否抑制政党偏袒？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3066429
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Marta Curto;alberT solé;Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro
我们研究了面临无争议选举的现任者是否比担心连任的现任者更愿意将公共支出投向两党官员。我们利用1995年至2007年期间西班牙各地区向地方政府分配的资本转移数据。使用回归不连续性设计，我们证明了强大而稳健的效果。我们发现，属于地区总统政党的市长获得的赠款是反对党市长的两倍。这种影响对于在上次选举中以较大优势获胜的地区现任者来说要大得多，但对于竞争激烈的选举来说，这种影响就消失了。(JEL D72、H76）
We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending toward co–partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995–2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition’s mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections. (JEL D72, H76)
影响因子：
10.7
作者：
Burgess, Robin;Jedwab, Remi;Padro i Miquel, Gerard
通讯作者：
Padro i Miquel, Gerard