Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities

Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities
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具有投资互补性的经济体的信息透明度和协调

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.502642
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发表时间:
2004
期刊:
MIT Economics Department Working Paper Series
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
A. Pavan
A. Pavan
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
G. Angeletos;A. Pavan

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在投资互补的经济体中,公共和私人信息如何影响均衡分配和社会福利?例如,经济统计数据、政策公告或媒体新闻所传达的信息的最佳透明度是什么?我们首先考虑一个互补性弱的环境,这样无论信息结构如何,均衡都是唯一的。提高公共信息的准确性可能会产生增加总体波动性的不利影响。然而,只要彩票没有价值,福利就会随着公共信息的相对或绝对准确性的增加而毫无疑问地增加。因此,完全透明是最佳的。这是因为更大的透明度有助于更有效的协调,从社会角度来看,这是有价值的。另一方面,当互补性足够强,多重均衡成为可能时,更高的透明度使市场能够更有效地协调好均衡或坏均衡。在这种情况下,如果更大的透明度很可能导致协调失败,那么建设性的模糊性就成为最佳选择。
How do public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare in economies with investment complementarities? And what is the optimal transparency in the information conveyed, for example, by economic statistics, policy announcements, or news in the media? We first consider an environment where the complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique no matter the structure of information. An increase in the precision of public information may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate volatility. Nevertheless, as long as there is no value to lotteries, welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute precision of public information. Hence, full transparency is optimal. This is because more transparency facilitates more effective coordination, which is valuable from a social perspective. On the other hand, when complementarities are strong enough that multiple equilibria are possible, more transparency permits the market to coordinate more effectively on either the bad or the good equilibrium. In this case, constructive ambiguity becomes optimal if there is a high risk that more transparency will lead to coordination failures.
DOI: 10.2307/1912324
发表时间: 1986-09-01
期刊: ECONOMETRICA
影响因子: 6.1
作者:
CUKIERMAN, A;MELTZER, AH
通讯作者: MELTZER, AH
不确定性、政策无效与宏观经济长期停滞
DOI: --
发表时间: --
期刊: Japan and the World Economy (forthcoming)
影响因子: --
作者:
Yoshikawa;Hiroshi;Masanao Aoki
通讯作者: Masanao Aoki