Managerial Objectives and the Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations

Managerial Objectives and the Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations
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公共和非营利组织的管理目标和治理

DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Jegers
M. Jegers
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
Stijn Van Puyvelde;R. Caers;C. Du Bois;M. Jegers

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摘要通过调查管理目标，我们测试同时需要控制（代理理论）和合作（管家理论）在公共和非营利治理。我们构建了一个离散的选择实验，以引起比利时公共和非营利性养老院的管理者的偏好。结果证实，董事会的养老院可能会遇到压力，同时控制和与他们的经理合作，从而表明，代理和管理理论可以结合到一个更一般的内部治理框架。最后，我们提供了一些政策建议，以改善公共和非营利治理。
Abstract By investigating managerial objectives, we test the simultaneous need for both control (agency theory) and collaboration (stewardship theory) in public and non-profit governance. We construct a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences of managers in Belgian public and non-profit nursing homes. The results confirm that boards of nursing homes may experience pressure to simultaneously control and collaborate with their managers, thereby suggesting that agency and stewardship theory can be combined into a more general internal governance framework. We conclude by providing some policy implications to improve public and non-profit governance.