Modeling Bounded Rationality
Modeling Bounded Rationality
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DOI：
10.2307/1060679
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发表时间：
1998-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Rubinstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Rubinstein
赫伯特·西蒙（Herbert Simon）在1950年代启动了有限理性的概念。直到最近，它才影响主流经济学。在本书中，阿里尔·鲁宾斯坦（Ariel Rubinstein）将有限理性的模型定义为明确嵌入选择过程的要素的模型。该书着重于建模有限理性的挑战，而不是实质性的经济影响。在本书的第一部分中，作者考虑了选择的建模。在讨论了一些心理发现之后，他继续进行程序合理性，知识，记忆，选择知识和小组决策的建模。在第二部分中，他讨论了模拟游戏中有限合理性的基本困难。他从具有程序理性玩家的游戏建模开始，然后以复杂的考虑来调查重复的游戏。他以讨论游戏中的可计算性约束的讨论结尾。最后一章包括赫伯特·西蒙（Herbert Simon）对作者方法论和作者的回应的批评。
The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions. In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response.