Federalisms, rights, and autonomies: The United States, Germany, and the EU
Federalisms, rights, and autonomies: The United States, Germany, and the EU
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联邦制、权利和自治：美国、德国和欧盟
DOI：
10.1093/icon/mox078
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Thomas Kleinlein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thomas Kleinlein
本文的目的是要证明，联邦结构和权利，虽然通常被分开，应在他们的互动研究。这可以通过比较美国和德国的宪政传统来说明。在这两种传统中，联邦制和权利以一种特有的方式相互作用。这些例子表明，联邦制既不应被视为一种完全的整体原则，也不应被视为一种个人主义原则。相反，联邦结构和权利之间的关系反映了个人和民主的相互依存关系。在欧洲联盟，对（准）联邦结构与权利之间相互作用的认识可以指导欧洲联盟法院作为基本权利法院。在对成员国适用欧盟基本权利时，法院应保持克制。更确切地说，从结构角度看，对法院给予的判断余地或联邦制折扣采取程序性办法是适当的。它不仅是对当前欧盟基本权利保护面临的挑战的一个适当回答，而且反映了欧盟民主合法性的双重结构。
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that federal structure and rights, though commonly kept apart, should be studied in their interaction. This can be illustrated by a comparison of the American and German constitutional traditions. In both traditions, federalism and rights interact in a characteristic way. These examples suggest that federalism should be viewed neither exclusively as a holistic principle nor as an individualistic principle. Rather, the relationship between federal structure and rights reflects the interdependence of individual and democratic autonomies. In the European Union, awareness of the interaction between (quasi-)federal structure and rights can guide the Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights court. When applying EU fundamental rights to the Member States, the Court should exercise restraint. More precisely, a procedural approach to the margin of appreciation or the federalism discount granted by the Court is appropriate from a structural point of view. It not only is an adequate answer to current challenges of fundamental rights protection in the EU but also reflects the EU’s dual structure of democratic legitimation.