Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
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DOI：
10.1088/1367-2630/10/4/043036
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发表时间：
2008-04-21
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Perc, Matjaz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Szolnoki, Attila;Perc, Matjaz
进化游戏是研究玩家的教学活动可以随着时间的推移而演变的游戏。最初，所有遵循合作或背叛策略的参与者都分布在正方形网格上。策略采用率由收益差异和一个教学活动决定，该教学活动表征了捐赠者对对手实施其策略的能力。每一个成功的战略采用过程都伴随着捐助者教学活动的增加。通过应用最佳值的增量，这个简单的机制自发地创建相关的不均匀性，在教学活动中，支持维护合作的囚徒困境和雪堆游戏。
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.