Living without a Government in Somalia: An Interview with Mark Bradbury: Development Processes in Somalia Exist Not as a Result of Official Development Assistance, but in Spite of It
Living without a Government in Somalia: An Interview with Mark Bradbury: Development Processes in Somalia Exist Not as a Result of Official Development Assistance, but in Spite of It
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索马里没有政府的生活：马克·布拉德伯里访谈：索马里的发展进程不是官方发展援助的结果，但尽管如此
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发表时间：
2003
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通讯作者：
M. Bradbury
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作者：
S. Feldman;B. Slattery;M. Bradbury
杂志：索马里的文化历史在非洲并不是独一无二的——许多国家都曾经历过殖民政府结构，并设法向国家过渡。为什么索马里的国家相对于邻国来说如此彻底崩溃？布拉德伯里：确定索马里战争和国家崩溃的单一因果解释没有什么价值。如果仅仅关注外国强加的殖民政府制度与本土政治制度之间的矛盾，就会忽视穆罕默德·西亚德·巴雷(Mohamed Siad Barre，1969-1991)21年军事统治时期的压迫性、腐败和暴力的政治庇护制度的影响、冷战和冷战后政治对该地区的影响、20世纪80年代结构调整和经济自由化政策的影响以及索马里武装运动的特征。显然，国家危机并非索马里独有。对于非洲和世界其他地方的许多人来说，冷战结束和资本主义进步所承诺的自由和平尚未实现。恰恰相反：全球政治、经济和社会变革导致东非、中非、西非、巴尔干半岛、中亚以及现在的中东政权更迭，导致数百万人死亡和流离失所。 “新世界秩序”一词——用来形容冷战后的世界——不仅预示着某种意识形态的进步，而且还预示着“秩序”可能或可能不依赖的机构和体系的变化。在非洲，这种新的世界秩序出现于 20 世纪 80 年代，其形式包括结构调整计划、国家去官僚化以及超国家和次国家实体的出现，这些实体削弱了国家机构和许多政府的内部合法性。这就产生了所谓的“准国家”或“崩溃国家”，它们具有不同程度的地方合法性、治理能力和资源。为了应对合法性危机，一些国家能够强加秩序。由于缺乏外部支持，索马里政府无法做到这一点。事实上，索马里的国家崩溃尤为严重，社会成本巨大。 20 世纪 90 年代初，索马里局势恶化，成为新国际机构（以多边维和行动的形式）管理新世界问题的试验场。 (1) 对全球经济边缘化和政治排斥的反应采取了不同的形式，新的政治形态通常在同一个国家内同时采取自由和非自由形式的权威。索马里境内出现了多个对领土和合法性主张相互重叠的当局。在西北部被称为索马里兰共和国的分裂地区，几年的稳定使那里的人民能够举行33年来的首次区议会和总统多党选举。尽管政府权威薄弱，而且类似国家的实体缺乏国际认可，但索马里兰的局势与索马里南部大部分地区持续不稳定形成鲜明对比。索马里和索马里兰走上不同道路的原因很复杂，但足以说明国家崩溃并不一定会自动增强掠夺性势力的力量。要理解为什么索马里人在某些地区表现出在没有国家的情况下也能生存的非凡能力，需要了解特定形式的社会和政治组织如何影响和适应国家的重塑。索马里的政治分裂与随着国家权力和合法性受到侵蚀而在索马里发展起来的基于亲属关系的庇护网络的力量有着错综复杂的联系。政治活动、商业部门和现有的发展进程只能结合社会的社会结构来理解。在过去的十年中，索马里人找到了独立于国家机构的生活方式和实现经济、社会、法律和安全安排的方式。 ……
Journal: Somalia's cultural history is not unique in Africa-many countries had colonial structures of government imposed on them and managed to make the transition to states. Why did Somalia's state collapse so completely in relation to its neighbors? Bradbury: There is little value in identifying single causal explanations for war and state collapse in Somalia. To focus solely on the contradictions between a foreign imposed colonial system of government and an indigenous political system would be to overlook the impact of the oppressive, corrupt and violent system of political patronage that marked the 21 year military rule of Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-1991), the influence of Cold War and post-Cold War politics in the region, the impact of structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies in the 1980s and the character of the armed movements in Somalia. Clearly, state crisis is not unique to Somalia. For many people in Africa and elsewhere in the world, the liberal peace promised by the ending of the Cold War and the advance of capitalism has not materialized. Quite the contrary: the global political, economic and social transformations that have brought about regime changes in east, central and west Africa, the Balkans, central Asia and now the Middle East, have left millions of people dead and displaced. The phrase "new world order"-used to describe the post-Cold War world-not only heralded the advance of a particular ideology, but also changes in the institutions and systems upon which "order" may or may not be based. In Africa the advent of this new world order appeared in the 1980s, in the form of structural adjustment programs, state de-bureaucratization and the emergence of supranational and sub-national entities that weakened state institutions and the internal legitimacy of many governments. This gave rise to what are described as "quasi-states" or "collapsed states" with varying degrees of local legitimacy, capacity and resources to govern. In response to crises of legitimacy some states are able to impose order. The Somali government, in the absence of external support, was unable to do so. Indeed, in Somalia state collapse was particularly profound and the social costs enormous. In the early 1990s Somalia's situation deteriorated when it became a testing ground for new international institutions-in the form of a multi-lateral peacekeeping operation-for managing the problems in the new world. (1) Responses to global economic marginalization and political exclusion have taken different forms, with new political formations assuming both liberal and illiberal forms of authority, often within the same country. Within Somalia several authorities have emerged with overlapping claims to territory and legitimacy. In the secessionist territory known as the Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, several years of stability has enabled the people there to hold the first district council and presidential multi-party elections in 33 years. Although government authority is weak and the state-like entity lacks international recognition, the situation in Somaliland contrasts greatly to the continued instability in much of southern Somalia. The reasons why Somalia and Somaliland have taken divergent paths is complex, but serves to illustrate that state collapse need not automatically empower predatory forces. Understanding why Somalis have demonstrated a remarkable ability to live without a state in certain areas requires knowing how particular forms of social and political organization have influenced and adapted to the reworking of the state. The political fragmentation of Somalia is intricately linked to the force of kinship-based patronage networks that developed in Somalia as state power and legitimacy eroded. Political activity, the business sector and existing development processes can only be understood in relation to the social fabric of society. Over the past decade Somalis have found ways of living and meeting economic, social, legal and security arrangements independent of state institutions. …