Coordination and Policy Traps
Coordination and Policy Traps
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协调与政策陷阱
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.410100
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Pavan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Angeletos;C. Hellwig;A. Pavan
本文考察了在市场参与者参与信息异质性的协调博弈环境下，决策者控制均衡结果的能力。我们在一个模型中考虑针对投机性货币攻击的防御政策，在这个模型中，投机者用特殊的噪音观察基本面。政策制定者只愿意为温和的基本面采取代价高昂的政策行动。市场参与者可以利用这些信息来协调对同一政策行动的不同反应，从而导致政策陷阱，其中贬值结果和最优政策的形状由自我实现的市场预期决定。尽管存在均衡多样性，但仍可以做出强有力的政策预测。货币贬值的概率在基本面上是单调的，政策制定者只对基本面温和的一小部分区域采取代价高昂的防御措施，随着市场中的信息变得精确，这一区域会缩小。
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in an environment where market participants play a coordination game with information heterogeneity. We consider defense policies against speculative currency attacks in a model where speculators observe the fundamentals with idiosyncratic noise. The policy maker is willing to take a costly policy action only for moderate fundamentals. Market participants can use this information to coordinate on di.erent responses to the same policy action, thus resulting in policy traps, where the devaluation outcome and the shape of the optimal policy are dictated by self-fulfilling market expectations. Despite equilibrium multiplicity, robust policy predictions can be made. The probability of devaluation is monotonic in the fundamentals, the policy maker adopts a costly defense measure only for a small region of moderate fundamentals, and this region shrinks as the information in the market becomes precise.