Substitution between Production Labor and Other Inputs in Unionized and Nonunionized Manufacturing
Substitution between Production Labor and Other Inputs in Unionized and Nonunionized Manufacturing
复制标题
工会和非工会制造业中生产劳动力与其他投入之间的替代
DOI：
10.2307/1924301
复制
发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
James L. Medoff
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Freeman;James L. Medoff
劳动力和其他生产要素之间的替代容易程度是劳动力需求弹性的重要决定因素，因此也是工会主义经济效应的重要决定因素。在其他条件不变的情况下，替代弹性越大，派生需求的弹性也就越大，对于工会引起的工资增长，劳动力的转移也就越大。在这种弹性很大的部门，工会可能相对“软弱”，只能赢得微小的工资增长（Freeman和Meiden，1981年及即将出版的著作），或者，如果他们赢得很大的收益，将不得不付出失去工作的高昂代价。在弹性较小的部门，工会可能能够以很小的就业成本获得可观的工资溢价。此外，正如一个简单的一般均衡模型所表明的那样，在工会部门中，劳动力和其他要素之间的替代弹性是决定工会工资效应对非工会工人的收入和经济效率的影响的关键参数（约翰逊和米斯科夫斯基，1970）。尽管劳动力需求的弹性对工会主义的分析很重要，但很少有人关注集体谈判下这种弹性的绝对和相对大小。虽然在制度文献中有一些关于技术变革以及资本和非生产工人取代有组织的生产工人的讨论（例如，Slichter，1941; Slichter，Healy and Livernash，1960; Bok and Dunlop，1970），现代计量经济学工作没有提供相关参数的估计。结果，约翰逊和米斯科夫斯基（1970）、里斯（1963）、刘易斯（1964）和其他人不得不用工会背景下关注弹性的“猜测”来评估工会的效果。本文试图通过对美国制造业的工会和非工会生产工人需求的恒定产出弹性以及这些工人与其他投入之间的替代弹性进行估计，来填补我们知识上的一些差距。分析集中在我们所说的“相对无弹性假说”，即在工会存在的情况下，对生产工人的需求将更加缺乏弹性，原因有两个：工会在弹性较低的部门组织和生存的可能性，以及各种合同条款对管理层用其他因素替代生产劳动力的能力的影响。本研究报告分为四个部分。第一节阐述了相对无弹性假说的基本原理，并描述了为检验其有效性而进行的实证分析的性质。第二部分使用1972年的2位数标准工业分类（SIC）的制造业数据文件，以估计美国制造业工会和非工会部门的生产劳动力与非生产劳动力和资本之间的替代弹性。第三部分基于1968 ~ 1972年的制造业企业样本，对生产劳动力和非生产劳动力（仅有的两种投入）之间的替代弹性进行了估计。最后一节简要总结了调查结果，并讨论了它们对理解工会主义对美国经济的影响的意义。为了预览接下来的讨论，我们的主要结论是：生产劳动力和其他投入之间的替代一般较低，在工会收到1978年3月6日。修订版于1981年8月17日接受出版。* 两位作者都就职于哈佛大学和国家经济研究局。由美国劳工部资助号J-9-M-6-0094，国家科学基金会资助号APT 77 -16279和国家经济研究局（根据其劳动经济学研究计划）支持。我们特别感谢Jane Mather对本项目的宝贵帮助，以及Greg Bialecki、Charles Brown、加里张伯伦、Kathy Coons、Jon Fay、Martin货车Denburgh和洛里威尔逊的重大贡献。国家统计局董事会尚未审查该研究报告。
THE ease of substitution between labor and other factors of production is an important determinant of the elasticity of demand for labor and thus of the economic effects of unionism. All else the same, the greater the elasticity of substitution, the greater is the elasticity of derived demand and the greater the displacement of labor for a given union-induced wage increase. In sectors where this elasticity is large, unions are likely to be relatively "weak" and able to win only slight wage gains (Freeman and Medoff, 1981 and forthcoming) or, if they win large gains, will have to pay a high price in terms of lost jobs. In the sectors where the elasticity is small, unions may be able to extract a substantial wage premium at little cost in terms of employment. Moreover, as a simple general equilibrium model indicates, the elasticity of substitution between labor and other factors in the unionized sector is a key parameter in determining the impact of the IIunion wage effect" on the earnings of nonunion workers and on the efficiency of the economy (Johnson and Mieskowski, 1970). Despite the importance of the elasticity of labor demand for an analysis of unionism, little attention has been given to the absolute and relative magnitude of this elasticity under collective bargaining. While there is some discussion of technological change and the substitution of capital and nonproduction workers for organized production workers in the institutional literature (e.g., Slichter, 1941; Slichter, Healy and Livernash, 1960; Bok and Dunlop, 1970), modern econometric work provides no estimates of the relevant parameters. As a result, Johnson and Mieskowski (1970), Rees (1963), Lewis (1964) and others have been forced to evaluate union effects with "guesstimates" of the elasticities of concern in union settings. This paper attempts to fill some of the gap in our knowledge by providing estimates for U.S. manufacturing of the constant output elasticity of demand for unionized and nonunionized production workers and of the elasticity of substitution between these workers and other inputs. The analysis concentrates on what we call the "relative inelasticity hypothesis," which states that the demand for production workers will be more inelastic in the presence of a union for two reasons: the likelihood that unions have organized and survived in sectors with low elasticities, and the effects of various contract provisions on the ability of management to substitute other factors for production labor. The study is divided into four sections. Section I develops the rationale for the relative inelasticity hypothesis and describes the nature of the empirical analysis conducted to test its validity. The second section uses a 1972 state by 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry data file for manufacturing to estimate the elasticity of substitution between production labor and both nonproduction labor and capital in the union and nonunion sectors of U.S. manufacturing industries. Section III provides estimates, based on a 1968-72 sample of manufacturing establishments, of the elasticity of substitution between production and nonproduction labor (the only two inputs for which information is available). The final section briefly summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for understanding the impact of trade unionism on the U.S. economy. To preview the ensuing discussion, our main conclusion is: Substitution between production labor and other inputs is generally lower in union Received for publication March 6, 1978. Revision accepted for publication August 17, 1981. * Both authors are with Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research. Supported by U.S. Department of Labor Grant No. J-9-M-6-0094, National Science Foundation Grant No. APT77-16279, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (under its program of research on labor economics). We are especially grateful to Jane Mather for her invaluable assistance on this project and to Greg Bialecki, Charles Brown, Gary Chamberlain, Kathy Coons, Jon Fay, Martin Van Denburgh, and Lori Wilson for their significant contributions. The study has not been reviewed by the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.