The impact of environmental tax revenue allocation on the consequence of lobbying activities
The impact of environmental tax revenue allocation on the consequence of lobbying activities
复制标题
环境税收入分配对游说活动结果的影响
DOI：
10.1007/s10101-020-00243-6
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Nakada Minoru
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nakada Minoru;Nakada Minoru
本文研究了在利益集团的影响下，税收分配规则如何决定环境税收的水平。一个特殊利益政治模型被修改为纳入环境税。存在两组代理。第一类人赚取工资收入，能源消费产生的污染产生负效用，并赚取能源行业的利润份额。第二类人挣工资，从污染中获得负效用，但不拥有股份。政府征收从价污染税，并将其收入的一部分用于补偿第一类人的税收负担，其余部分用于公共减排。两种制度被认为是。首先，资源租赁集团游说政府保护其收入来源。第二，一个有环保意识的团体游说政府将收入用于减少污染。转移到税收收入的临界比例是为了实现社会最优的环境税税率，即使税率受到利益集团的影响。
This paper investigates how a tax revenue allocation rule determines the level of environmental taxation influenced by interest groups. A model of special interest politics is modified to incorporate environmental taxation. Two groups of agents exist. The first group earns wage income, has negative utility derived from pollution generated by energy consumption, and earns a profit share of the energy industry. The second group earns wages and has negative utility from pollution, but does not own shares. The government imposes an ad-valorem pollution tax and spends a proportion of its revenue as compensation for the tax burden on the first group and the remainder on public abatement. Two regimes are considered. First, a resource-rent group lobbies the government to protect its income source. Second, an environmentally conscious group lobbies the government to spend the revenue for pollution reduction. The critical proportion of transfer to tax revenue is derived to achieve the socially optimal rate of environmental taxation, even when the tax rate is subject to the influence of interest groups.