Pricing models in a sustainable supply chain with capacity constraint
Pricing models in a sustainable supply chain with capacity constraint
复制标题
产能约束的可持续供应链中的定价模型
DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.319
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Mingzhu Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jian Wang;Zhuang Zhou;Mingzhu Yu
在本文中，我们研究了一个供应商和一个第三方收集者相互竞争，并有更多的定价权比制造商的生产能力限制的闭环供应链。最优定价，回收和再制造策略。提出了三种定价模型来讨论不同情景下的策略：零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型，第三方收藏家主导的Stackelberg博弈模型和纳什博弈模型。通过理论分析和数值研究发现：（1）广告和促销等策略能使管理者获得更大的市场偏好，而供应商在选择这些策略时却陷入两难境地，必须在利润和供应链可持续性之间进行权衡;（2）供应商或第三方收集者在充当追随者时获得更多利润，而供应商-领导博弈情境是供应链中回收再制造活动的最佳情境;（3）供应商在选择决策序列时也面临着在利润和供应链可持续性之间进行平衡的困境。
In this paper, we investigate a closed-loop supply chain with one supplier and one third-party collector who compete with each other and have more pricing power than the manufacturer with production capacity constraints. The optimal pricing, recycling and remanufacturing strategies are derived. Three pricing models are proposed to discuss strategies under different scenarios: the supplier-led Stackelberg game model, the third-party collector-led Stackelberg game model and the Nash game model. Through theoretical analysis and numerical studies, it is found that (1) strategies such as advertising and promotion can gain more market preference for managers yet cause a dilemma for the supplier who must balance between profit and supply chain sustainability when choosing these strategies; (2) the supplier or the third-party collector gain more profit when they act as the follower and the supplier-led game scenario is the best scenario for the recycling and remanufacturing activities in the supply chain; (3) it is also a dilemma for the supplier to balance between profit and supply chain sustainability when choosing a decision sequence.