A write-time based memristive PUF for hardware security applications

A write-time based memristive PUF for hardware security applications
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DOI:
10.5555/2561828.2561987
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发表时间:
2013-11
期刊:
2013 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
G. Rose;N. McDonald;Lok K. Yan;B. Wysocki
G. Rose;N. McDonald;Lok K. Yan;B. Wysocki
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
G. Rose;N. McDonald;Lok K. Yan;B. Wysocki

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硬件安全已经成为一个重要的研究领域,旨在减轻盗版,假冒和侧信道攻击等问题。用于这种硬件安全攻击的一种流行的解决方案是物理不可克隆功能(PUF),其提供硬件特定的唯一签名或标识。PUF的唯一性取决于各个集成电路内的固有工艺变化。随着工艺变化由于技术缩放到纳米范围而变得更加普遍,新颖的纳米电子技术(诸如忆阻器)成为新兴集成电路中用于改进安全性的可行选择。在本文中,我们描述了一种新的忆阻PUF(M-PUF)架构,利用忆阻器的写时间的变化作为熵源。结果表明,M-PUF在唯一性、均匀性和比特混叠方面具有很强的统计性能。此外,纳米级M-PUF显示出与CMOS对应物相比具有降低的面积利用率。
Hardware security has emerged as an important field of study aimed at mitigating issues such as piracy, counterfeiting, and side channel attacks. One popular solution for such hardware security attacks are physical unclonable functions (PUF) which provide a hardware specific unique signature or identification. The uniqueness of a PUF depends on intrinsic process variations within individual integrated circuits. As process variations become more prevalent due to technology scaling into the nanometer regime, novel nanoelectronic technologies such as memristors become viable options for improved security in emerging integrated circuits. In this paper, we describe a novel memristive PUF (M-PUF) architecture that utilizes variations in the write-time of a memristor as an entropy source. The results presented show strong statistical performance for the M-PUF in terms of uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing. Additionally, nanoscale M-PUFs are shown to exhibit reduced area utilization as compared to CMOS counterparts.