Reduced games, consistency, and the core
Reduced games, consistency, and the core
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减少游戏、一致性和核心
DOI：
10.1007/bf01271129
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发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Koichi Tadenuma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Koichi Tadenuma
本文利用Moulin（1985）引入的一种新的简化对策的内部一致性，建立了核心的公理化。给定某个博弈的解所选择的收益向量，以及给定agent的子组，我们定义了子组中的每个联盟只有在与子组外所有成员的初始收益相容时才能获得其成员收益的简化博弈。解是一致的，即它选择与初始化博弈相同的收益分布。我们证明了一致性和个体理性是可转让和不可转让效用博弈的核心特征。
This paper establishes an axiomatization of the core by means of an internal consistency property with respect to a new reduced game introduced by Moulin (1985). Given a payoff vector chosen by a solution for some game, and given a subgroup of agents, we define thereduced gameas that in which each coalition in the subgroup could attain payoffs to its members only if they are compatible with the initial payoffs toallthe members outside of the subgroup. The solution isconsistentif it selects the same payoff distribution for the reduced game as initially. We show that consistency together with individual rationality characterizes the core of both transferable and non-transferable utility games.