Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment
Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment
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DOI：
10.1111/1468-0297.00435
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发表时间：
1999-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Burdett;M. Coles
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Burdett;M. Coles
当然，婚姻和就业是不同的。然而，找工作的工人、寻找工人的®RM或寻找婚姻伴侣的单身人士都面临着类似的问题，就像他们都在寻找长期伴侣一样。事实上，建立长期的伙伴关系在生活中是司空见惯的。还有许多其他的例子？商务人士寻找其他商务人士来建立PRO®桌上关系，桥牌选手寻找合适的合作伙伴，学生寻找好的大学，我们都希望找到一个好朋友，等等。如果与不同的合作伙伴建立合作伙伴关系所获得的回报有实质性的差异，问题就变得非常明显。例如，雇主提供的工资或提供的工作环境不同。在这种情况下，工人可能会拒绝一些工作机会。同样，正如许多人付出代价所学到的那样，一些人比其他人更能成为更好的婚姻伴侣。问题是两面性的。当工人评估潜在雇主时，雇主也在评估工人。正是这个问题的这种两面性引起了人们的极大兴趣。工人是否愿意接受®RM的工作不仅取决于®RM的特点，还取决于工人可以选择的其他可能选择。一个人在其他地方的机会越好，他或她在评估潜在伴侣关系时就越有选择性。一位认为哈佛可能在不久的将来提出录取条件的学者，将在评估来自较小大学的录取条件时更加挑剔。通过这种方式，期望起到了作用。如果一个单身男人认为很少有女人会给他找到一个可以接受的婚姻伴侣，那么他可能会接受出现的第一个机会。合伙企业的形成通常不符合典型的市场情况，在这种情况下，所有参与者都知道一切，所有交易都是零成本进行的。找工作、结识丈夫或妻子或结识商业伙伴是一项耗时的活动，机会通常会随着时间的推移以不确定的时间间隔到来。当然，我们可以采取一些方式来影响潜在伴侣的到达率。工人去职业介绍所，或阅读报纸上的招聘广告，一定年龄的单身人士去迪斯科舞厅，或加入网球俱乐部。关于搜索和匹配(SM)的文献(见Mortensen(1982)和Pissarides(1990)的早期例子)1为《经济期刊》提供了一个很好的框架，109(6)，F307±F334。#皇家经济学会，1999年。由布莱克韦尔出版社出版，地址为英国牛津OX4 1JF考利路108号和美国马萨诸塞州马尔登主街350号，邮编：02148。
Of course, marriage and employment are different. Nevertheless, a worker looking for a job, a ®rm looking for worker, or a single person looking for a marriage partner face similar problems as all are seeking a long-term partner. Indeed, forming long-term partnerships is a common occurrence in life. There are many other examples ± business people search for other business people to form a pro®table relationship, bridge players seek to ®nd a suitable partners, students search for a good university, we would all like to ®nd a good friend, etc. The problem becomes signi®cant if there are substantial differences in the return obtained from forming a partnership with different partners. For example, employers differ in the wages they offer, or in the work environment they provide. In such a situation a worker may reject some job offers. Similarly, as many have learned to their cost, some make better marriage partners than others. The problem is two-sided. While a worker is evaluating a potential employer, the employer is also evaluating the worker. It is this two-sided aspect of the problem that generates a signi®cant interest. A worker's willingness to accept employment at a ®rm depends not only on the characteristics of the ®rm but also the other possible options open to the worker. The better an individual's opportunities elsewhere, the more selective he or she will be in evaluating a potential partnership. An academic who believes Harvard may make an offer in the near future, will be more selective in evaluating offers from lesser universities. In this way expectations play a role. If a single man believes that few, if any, women will ®nd him an acceptable marriage partner, then he may accept the ®rst opportunity that presents itself. Partnership formation, typically, does not comply with a classic market situation, where all participants know everything and all trades take place at zero cost. Finding a job, ®nding a husband or wife, or ®nding a business partner is a time consuming activity where opportunities typically arrive over time at uncertain intervals of time. Of course, we can act in ways that in uence the arrival rate of potential partner. Workers go to employment agencies, or read help wanted advertisements in newspapers, singles of a certain age go to discos, or join tennis clubs. The literature on search and matching (SM) (see Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1990) for early examples)1 provides an excellent framework for The Economic Journal, 109 ( June), F307±F334. # Royal Economic Society 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.