The use of control mechanisms in coalition governments
The use of control mechanisms in coalition governments
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联合政府中控制机制的运用
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Albert Falcó
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Albert Falcó
在本文中，我认为只有当使用妥协政策的预期收益足够高时，联盟才会倾向于使用控制机制来促进妥协政策的采用。当合作伙伴已经对滚动策略（按管辖权划分）感到满意时，或者当妥协已经可以自行实现时，就很少有动机使用它们。相反，当合作伙伴对妥协政策感兴趣，但无法达到均衡的结果时，可能会实施控制机制。所提供的经验证据倾向于支持这项工作的两个主要假设：当伴侣偏好的切线性很高时，当他们预见到频繁的相互互动时，控制机制就不那么必要了。然而，这似乎更适用于分配负责监督的初级部长，而不是制定全面的政策协议。
In this article I argue that coalitions will tend to employ control mechanisms to facilitate the adoption of compromise policies only when the expected benefit of their use is high enough. When partners are already satisfied with log-rolling policies (compartmentalized by jurisdiction), or when compromise is already attainable self-enforcingly, there are few incentives to use them. Conversely, when partners are interested in compromise policies but are unable to reach that outcome in equilibrium, then control mechanisms are likely to be implemented. The empirical evidence offered tends to support the two main hypotheses of this work: control mechanisms are less necessary when the tangentiality of partners’ preferences is high and when they foresee frequent mutual interactions. However, that seems to work better for the allocation of watchdog junior ministers rather than for the writing of comprehensive policy agreements.