From vendors to partners: Information technology and incomplete contracts in buyer‐supplier relationships
From vendors to partners: Information technology and incomplete contracts in buyer‐supplier relationships
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DOI：
10.1080/10919399309540206
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
J. Bakos;Erik Brynjolfsson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Bakos;Erik Brynjolfsson
理论预测，随着搜索成本和其他协调成本的下降，企业应该最佳地增加与之开展业务的供应商数量。尽管最近由于信息技术而导致这些成本下降，但几乎没有证据表明所使用的供应商数量有所增加。相反，在许多行业，企业与更少的供应商合作。这表明在更完整的买方供应商关系模型中必须考虑其他力量。本文使用不完全契约理论来说明激励因素可以促使买方限制雇用的供应商数量。为了诱导供应商进行无法通过合同机制以令人满意的方式指定和执行的投资，买方必须承诺不征收此类投资的事后盈余。在合理的议价机制下，如果买方能够从较少的替代供应商中进行选择，这样的承诺就会更加可信。信息技术提高了供应商不可承包投资的重要性，例如质量、响应能力和创新；研究表明，当此类投资特别重要时，企业将雇用更少的供应商，即使搜索和交易成本非常低，情况也是如此。
As search costs and other coordination costs decline, theory predicts that firms should optimally increase the number of suppliers with which they do business. Despite recent declines in these costs due to information technology, there is little evidence of an increase in the number of suppliers used. On the contrary, in many industries, firms are working with fewer suppliers. This suggests that other forces must be accounted for in a more complete model of buyer supplier relationships. This article uses the theory of incomplete contracts to illustrate that incentive considerations can motivate a buyer to limit the number of employed suppliers. To induce suppliers to make investments that cannot be specified and enforced in a satisfactory manner via a contractual mechanism, the buyer must commit not to expropriate the ex post surplus from such investments. Under reasonable bargaining mechanisms, such a commitment will be more credible if the buyer can choose from fewer alternative suppliers. Information technology increases the importance of noncontractible investments by suppliers, such as quality, responsiveness, and innovation; it is shown that when such investments are particularly important, firms will employ fewer suppliers, and this will be true even when search and transaction costs are very low.