The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty
The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty
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推动最高法院撤资和贬低部落主权的自由势力
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发表时间：
2000
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Tweedy
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作者：
A. Tweedy
本文考察了最高法院实质上放弃了以领土为基础的印度部落主权概念，转而支持基于同意的概念，以及最近将部落主权描述为一种特殊权利，只有弱小和依附的部落才能要求这一权利。它最终将这些趋势归因于最高法院在民权运动之后的几十年里越来越关注自由目标。最高法院利用自由主义来侵蚀印度久负盛名的法律学说，这表明继续应用自由主义思想会给美国等多元文化社会带来严重问题。这些问题包括根据法律废除印第安人部落的特殊地位，更广泛地说，威胁到所有非自愿融入占多数的白人文化的从属群体。在第二部分中，提交人按时间顺序分析了最高法院在过去二十年中判决的几起严重侵犯部落主权的案件。第三部分更狭隘地关注最高法院在最近的案件中用来缩小和削弱部落主权的两种可疑方法：1)忽视或削弱印度法律中的建筑法规的力量，以达到对印度部落不利的结果；2)解释国会法案的立法意图，而不参考后来的立法历史，如修改或彻底否认，以达到不利印度部落并实质上侵蚀他们的主权的结果。在第四部分，作者讨论了最高法院使用社会契约理论作为其裁决的隐含基础，特别是那些表现出以同意为基础的部落主权的裁决。在第五部分，作者认为，最高法院废除印度主权的动机是因为它越来越自由地认为这种主权是一种特殊的、基于种族的权利，这一点由于其对种族的关注，违反了自由平等理论。作者的结论是，自由主义必须被彻底修改或摒弃，以维护从属文化的独特性，特别是印第安人部落的主权。
This paper examines the Supreme Court’s substantial abandonment of a territorially based conception of Indian tribal sovereignty in favor of a consent-based conception and its recent characterization of tribal sovereignty as a special right, which may be claimed only by weak and dependent tribes. It ultimately attributes these trends, in significant part, to the Supreme Court’s increasing preoccupation with liberal goals in the decades following the Civil Rights Movement. The Supreme Court’s use of liberalism to erode well-established Indian law doctrines suggests that the continued application of liberal ideas poses serious problems for multicultural societies like the United States. These problems include the abolition of Indian tribes’ special status under the law and, more broadly, a threat to all subordinated groups of involuntary assimilation into the majority white culture. In part II, the author analyzes in chronological order several Supreme Court cases, decided within the last two decades that have made significant encroachments upon tribal sovereignty. Part III focuses more narrowly on two of the suspect methods the Supreme Court has used in recent cases to shrink and degrade tribal sovereignty: 1) ignoring or diminishing the force of the canons of construction in Indian law in order to reach a result unfavorable to Indian tribes, and 2) construing the legislative intent of acts of Congress without reference to subsequent legislative history, such as amendment or outright repudiation, in order to reach a result which disfavors Indian tribes and substantially erodes their sovereignty. In part IV, the author discusses the Supreme Court’s use of social contract theory as an implicit basis of its decisions, especially those that evince a consent-based view of tribal sovereignty.In part V, the author argues that the Supreme Court is motivated to dismantle Indian sovereignty because of its increasingly liberal view that such sovereignty is a special, race-based right, which, through its very focus on race, violates liberal equality theory. The author concludes that liberalism must be drastically modified or abandoned in order to preserve the uniqueness of subordinated cultures in general and the sovereignty of Indian tribes in particular.