Attack-Resilient Pulse-Coupled Synchronization
Attack-Resilient Pulse-Coupled Synchronization
复制标题
抗攻击脉冲耦合同步
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Yongqiang Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhenqian Wang;Yongqiang Wang
脉冲耦合振荡器的同步由于其简单、隐式可扩展性和高能量效率而在传感器网络和无线通信中越来越受欢迎。然而，大多数现有结果是在没有恶意攻击的情况下获得的。本文研究了抗恶意攻击的脉冲耦合同步方法。不仅得到了隐形攻击的条件，而且还解析地证明了，即使当合法振荡器具有不同的初始相位时，即使存在隐形攻击，脉冲耦合同步也是可以保证的。这与大多数现有的抗攻击同步算法（包括Lamport和Melliar-Smith的开创性论文）有着明显的区别，后者需要在合法节点之间进行先验（几乎）同步。数值试验验证了理论分析的正确性.
Synchronization of pulse-coupled oscillators is gaining increased popularity in sensor networks and wireless communications due to its simplicity, implicit scalability, and high energy efficiency. However, most existing results are obtained in the absence of malicious attacks. This paper addresses pulse-coupled synchronization resilient to malicious attacks. Not only is the condition for stealthy attacks obtained, but we also prove analytically that pulse-coupled synchronization can be guaranteed despite the presence of a stealthy attacker, even when legitimate oscillators have different initial phases. This is in distinct difference from most of the existing attack-resilient synchronization algorithms (including the seminal paper from Lamport and Melliar-Smith) that require a priori (almost) synchronization among legitimate nodes. Numerical simulations confirm the theoretical results.
影响因子：
4.3
作者：
Canavier CC;Achuthan S
通讯作者：
Achuthan S