On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
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论赤字与低效率的权衡与固定交易费用的双重拍卖
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00587.x
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Tymon Tatur
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tymon Tatur
在许多贸易环境中，任何与激励相容和个体理性的市场机制要么效率低下，要么会出现赤字。我们证明，当市场规模m变大时，对于任何固定的盈余（或赤字）x， m乘以最小绝对效率收敛于c(x)，其中c（⋅）本质上是textitx的二次函数。我们引入了一种新的机制，即固定交易费用的双重拍卖。通过适当地选择费用的大小，可以实现任何水平的赤字或盈余，并且由此产生的机制达到上述界限。版权所有计量经济学会2005。
In many trading environments, any incentive compatible and individually rational market mechanism will be either inefficient or will run a deficit. We prove that as the market size m gets large, for any fixed surplus (or deficit) x, m times the minimal absolute inefficiency converges to c(x) where c( ⋅ ) is essentially a quadratic function of textitx. We introduce a new mechanism, the double auction with a fixed transaction fee. By choosing the size of the fee appropriately, any level of deficit or surplus can be implemented and the resulting mechanisms achieve the above bound. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.