Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme
Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme
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附加条件有效吗？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1641175
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Dreher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hannes Öhler;Peter Nunnenkamp;A. Dreher
有人提出，以业绩为基础的援助是一种替代失败的传统办法，即捐助者以受援国的改革承诺为援助条件。然而，几乎没有任何经验证据存在事后奖励是否有效地诱导改革。我们试图通过调查千年挑战公司（MCC）是否成功地促进了更好地控制腐败来填补这一空白。我们采用差异中差异（DDD）的方法，考虑不同的方式来定义治疗组以及不同的时间段，在此期间，激励效果可能已经实现。我们发现有证据表明，在MCC宣布后，立即产生了强烈的预期效应，而MCC援助的时间和数量的不确定性越来越大，随着时间的推移，似乎削弱了打击腐败的动力。
Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appear to weaken the incentive to fight corruption over time.