Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Buzek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol
Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Buzek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol
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DOI：
10.1103/physreva.76.062324
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发表时间：
2007-12
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
S. Qin;F. Gao;Q. Wen;F. Zhu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Qin;F. Gao;Q. Wen;F. Zhu
参与者攻击是量子秘密共享协议面临的最大威胁。本文以Hillery，Buzek，and Berthiaume（HBB）方案[Phys. Rev. A 59 1829（1999）]为例，给出了一种分析量子秘密共享协议抗这类攻击的安全性的方法.通过区分两个混合状态，得到了一个不诚实的参与者可以在不引入任何错误的情况下获得所有信息的充要条件，从而证明了HBB协议对不诚实的参与者是不安全的. Karlsson，Koashi，and Imoto [Phys. Rev. A 59，162（1999）]的攻击方案是我们结果的一个特例，这一点很容易验证。为了进一步证明我们的结果，我们根据充分必要条件构造了一个显式攻击方案。我们的工作完成了HBB协议的安全性分析，所提出的方法可以用于分析其他类似的协议。
The participant attack is the most serious threat for quantum secret-sharing protocols. We present a method to analyze the security of quantum secret-sharing protocols against this kind of attack taking the scheme of Hillery, Buzek, and Berthiaume (HBB) [Phys. Rev. A 59 1829 (1999)] as an example. By distinguishing between two mixed states, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a dishonest participant can attain all the information without introducing any error, which shows that the HBB protocol is insecure against dishonest participants. It is easy to verify that the attack scheme of Karlsson, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. A 59, 162 (1999)] is a special example of our results. To demonstrate our results further, we construct an explicit attack scheme according to the necessary and sufficient conditions. Our work completes the security analysis of the HBB protocol, and the method presented may be useful for the analysis of other similar protocols.