On the Formal Veri cation of the TCAS Con ictResolution Algorithms 1
On the Formal Veri cation of the TCAS Con ictResolution Algorithms 1
复制标题
TCAS冲突解决算法的形式化验证1
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Nancy A. LynchLaboratory
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Lygeros;Nancy A. LynchLaboratory
TCAS是一种机载协议，用于检测飞机之间的连接，并向飞行员提供解决方案。由于其安全关键的作用，TCAS软件最好在部署之前进行验证。由于TCAS代码的复杂性和系统的混合特性，验证任务具有挑战性。我们展示了如何捕捉这个非常复杂的问题的本质，一个相对简单的混合模型，服从正式分析。然后，我们概述了一种方法来建立条件下，由TCAS发出的认证是安全的。
TCAS is an on-board protocol for detecting connicts between aircraft and providing resolution advisories to the pilots. Because of its safety-critical role the TCAS software should ideally be veriied" before it can be deployed. The veriication task is challenging, due to the complexity of the TCAS code and the hybrid nature of the system. We show how the essence of this very complicated problem can be captured by a relatively simple hybrid model, amenable to formal analysis. We then outline a methodology for establishing conditions under which the advisories issued by TCAS are safe.