Coordination mechanisms
Coordination mechanisms
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tcs.2009.01.005
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发表时间：
2009-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Christodoulou;E. Koutsoupias;Akash Nanavati
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文献类型：
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作者：
G. Christodoulou;E. Koutsoupias;Akash Nanavati
We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and non-colluding agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.
